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Abstract 
We propose a mechanism for the promotion of 
high-standards in commercial Artificial Intelligence 
products, namely an association of companies which 
would regulate their own membership using a code 
of practice and the precedents set by previous 
cases. Membership would provide some assurance of 
quality. We argue the benefits of such a 
mechanism, and discuss some of the details including 
the proposal of a code of practice. This paper is 
intended as a vehicle for discussion rather than as 
the presentation of a definitive solution. 
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1. The Need for High Standards in AI Products 
Credibility has always been a precious asset for 
AI, but never more so than now. The current 
commercial interest in AI is giving us the chance to 
prove ourselves. If the range of AI products now 
coming onto the market are shown to provide 
genuine solutions to hard problems then we have a 
rosy future. A few such useful products have been 
produced, but our future could still be jeopardised 
by a few, well publicised, failures. 
Genuine failures - where there was determined, 
but ultimately unsuccessful, effort to solve a 
problem - are regrettable, but not fatal. Every 
technology has its limitations. What we have to 
worry about are charlatans and incompetents taking 
advantage of the current fashion and selling 
products which are overrated or useless. AI might 
then be stigmatised as a giant con-trick, and the 
current tide of enthusiasm would ebb as fast as it 
flowed. (Remember Machine Translation - it could 
still happen.) Both companies selling AI products and 
academic AI research groups would suffer in the 
resulting crash. 
AI companies are very dependent on the good-will 
of their customers. The current life-span of typi-
cal AI products is about 1-5 years. The customers 
of AI products are likely to stay in the market for 
several times this period; typically they are them-
selves companies or academic groups engaged in AI 
research or interested in the long term application 
of AI techniques. To stay in business the AI 
company must sell successive upgrades of its 
products to the same group of customers and, 
therefore, must build up and maintain a good 
reputation. If AI business is to expand then new 
customers must be brought into this existing group. 
This will only happen if the overall range of AI 
products is of high-quality and the reputation of 
this particular company is good. Thus it is in the 
interests of each company to raise both the general 
and its particular standard. It must also convince 
customers that its products are of high standard. 
When the market was small a company with high-
quality products could win new customers by word 
of mouth. Now the market is growing they must 
use advertisements, and it becomes harder for a 
company to convince potential customers that its 
products are of high quality. 
Apart from improving the public image of AI and 
increasing the market for AI products, producing 
more high-quality products would raise morale and 
standards in AI itself, leading to a virtuous circle 
of standards being raised, better work being done, 
good people being attracted to the field, and even 
more high quality products emerging. Poor-quality 
products will produce a vicious circle going in the 
opposite direction. 
But these internal reasons for wanting high stan-
dards, while important to insiders, are perhaps less 
important than external reasons. AI products look 
destined to play a major role in society. That 
society deserves, and has the right to expect, 
protection from exploitation by AI companies and 
from being harmed by AT products. 
An extreme, potential example of such harm is 
described in [Thompson et al 84], which argues that 
it is not possible to build an automatic or semi-
automatic launch-on-warning system for nuclear 
weapons with anything like an acceptable failure 
rate. Anybody who claimed to have done so, or who 
claimed to be able to do so, would be guilty of 
misleading the public in a way that could have 
disastrous consequences. If such a claimant were an 
AI company then the whistle might be blown on it 
by the mechanism described below. 
However, the main purpose of this proposal is to 
catch less apocalyptic, but more common-place, mis-
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leading claims, whether or not they might give rise 
to a legal remedy. Examples might be an expert 
systems shell whose advertised range far exceeds 
the problems it is really suitable for, or a natural 
language front end which is presented as being able 
to deal with a much wider input than it, in fact, 
can. 
2. A Professional Association 
The academic field guards itself against charlatans 
and incompetents by the peer review of research 
papers, grants, PhDs, etc. There is no equivalent 
safeguard in the commercial AI field. Faced with 
this problem other fields set up professional as-
sociations and codes of practice. AI needs a 
similar set-up. We propose that the responsible AI 
companies should get together now to found such 
an association. Continued membership should depend 
on a constant high-standard of AI products and 
in-house expertise. Members would be able to ad-
vertise their membership, and customers would have 
some assurance of quality. Charlatans and incom-
petents would be excluded or ejected, so that the 
failure of their products would not be seen to 
reflect on the field as a whole nor on the com-
panies in the Association. 
Since the trade in AI products is international, 
with multi-national companies involved both as ven-
dors and customers, the Association would also need 
to be international. Otherwise, there would be 
difficulty over membership of multi-national com-
panies and about dealing with complaints resulting 
from international sales. It is particularly important 
to make membership attractive to multi-nationals 
because, with their existing reputation, they have 
less to gain from the cachet of membership and 
are more able to avoid the full impact of national 
registration. 
The Association would be self-regulating. If its 
decisions were seen to be too arbitrary then the 
value of Association membership would be devalued in 
the eyes of the public, the customers and the 
vendors, and the importance of its decisions would 
decrease in proportion; customers would take no 
account of Association membership when deciding to 
buy, so vendors would not bother to join. For 
such self-regulation to work it is necessary for the 
Association to be publically visible. Both vendors 
and potential customers must be aware of the As-
sociation and must see its decisions as fair and its 
sanctions as effective. Customers will then use 
Association membership as a major determinant when 
deciding whether and what product to buy. Ven-
dors will regard Association membership as a valuable 
asset to their company, and will aim for high 
quality in their products in order to retain mem-
bership. They will want to use Association member-
ship in their advertising, and this will, in turn, 
improve the visibility of the Association. It will be 
necessary for the Association to maintain a high 
profile of both its existence and its actions, to be 
1E.g. the Vehicle Builders and Repairers Association and the 
National Association of Estate Agents. Note that, unless 
otherwise stated, all examples are of UK institutions or laws. 
open about its decisions, and to employ effective 
sanctions. 
The Association would need a panel to consider 
applications for membership and to hear complaints 
against members. Its main sanction would be refus-
ing membership or expelling existing members, 
backed up by lesser sanctions like a public admoni-
tion, payment of compensation, etc. The rules of 
the Association might include a contractually binding 
committment by members to fulfil any compensation 
order made by the panel. The Association might 
also insist that contracts issued by members con-
tained various standard clauses, e.g. giving customers 
the right of reimbursement if returning products 
within a certain period, guaranteeing compensation 
under certain circumstances, insisting that precise, 
testable statements be made about the product, 
etc." The panel need only take a passive role in 
determing disputes; it would publicise its address 
and its willingness to hear complaints. The burden 
of making a case complaint would fall on the com-
plainant. The panel might then need to employ a 
small team of experts to investigate discrepancies 
between the evidence brought by the complainant 
and that by the company complained of. This 
investigative team could be recruited on an ad hoc 
basis, e.g. academic researchers as consultants. 
The complainant would usually be the dissatisfied 
purchaser of one of the companies products, but 
could be any member of the public with a 
legitimate interest in the product. There might be 
a multi-stage process, so that cases were only 
heard by the full panel when a prima-facie case had 
been established. This is to fi l ter out malicious 
complaints and those that are outwith the remit of 
the panel. It would not be necessary actively to 
investigate AI products or companies before any 
complaint had been received, and would probably be 
prohibitively expensive to do so. 
The panel needs a code of practice to which 
members would agree to adhere and which would 
serve as a basis for applying sanctions. What form 
should such a code take, i.e. what counts as 
malpractice in AI? We suspect malpractice may be 
a lot harder to define in AI than in insurance, 
architecture or travel agency. 
- Due to the state of the art, AI products 
cannot be perfect. No-one expects 1002 
accurate diagnosis of all known diseases. 
On the other hand a program which only 
works for slight variations of the stan-
dard demo is clearly a con. Where is 
the threshold to be drawn and how can 
it be defined? 
- It is unlikely that any current AI product 
could fulfil a claim to: understand any 
natural language input, or to make pro-
gramming redundant, or to allow the user 
to volunteer any information what-so-ever. 
However, the claimant could defend the 
2C.f. the Vehicle Builders and Repairers Association which 
has standard forms for estimates and recommends clauses in 
repair contracts. 
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claim by debating the meaning of 
'understand'. 'programming', or 
'information', and this would muddy the 
water. What constitutes an exaggerated 
claim? 
- Given the ambiguity of such terms it 
would be difficult to decide whether an 
exaggerated claim was intended to deceive 
or was due to a difference in terms or 
was just a genuine oversight on the part 
of the vendor. How is a vendor's claim to 
be assessed? Should one try to assess the 
vendor's intention, or should one ignore 
this and only assess how a reasonable cus-
tomer might interprete the claim? 
- Because of the ambiguity of such terms 
the full description of an AI product 
must describe its limitations, e.g. what 
sentences it cannot understand, as well as 
its abilities. It is not enough to refrain 
from false claims. 
- A vendor may claim that it cannot ac-
curately describe the limitations of its 
product without revealing confidential in-
formation about the technique and/or 
software it is based on. The problem is 
particularly acute for software products 
because of the lack of protection af-
forded by patent and copyright law. 
Where do we draw the line between a 
complete and accurate description of the 
capabilities of the product and the 
protection of trade secrets? 
The difficulty is to give a precise definition of 
what constitutes reasonable behaviour on the part 
of a vendor. It seems impossible to cover all the 
possible situations, in advance, with a list of precise 
standards to be attained, but it is often possible 
retrospectively to detect unreasonable practice in 
particular cases. The usual legal solution to such 
problems is to use a high-level code in combination 
with judgements about individual cases in order to 
build up gradually a picture of the reasonable ven-
dor, i.e. to establish case law', and to use this 
to evaluate complaints rather than to pre-vet 
products. Note, however, that it takes a long 
time to build up an extensive range of cases 
- most of the early judgements must be made 
solely on the basis of the high-level code. 
The panel would evaluate a complaint against this 
code. They would be able to take account of the 
state of the art and compare the product with 
the claims made for it. A high-level code and the 
injunction to judge 'reasonableness' would enable the 
panel to assess whether the spirit of the code had 
Law is in scare quotas bacause wa ara dafining an 
axtra-lagal mechanism. 
Compare, for instances, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
which uaaa caaa law to dafina raaaonablanaaa in ralation to 
exclusion clauaaa. 
been broken, rather than the letter of some 
spuriously precise, low-level code. The accumulation 
of case 'law' would ensure some uniformity of 
treatment, and prevent favouritism or victimisation. 
Openness about the grounds for decisions would also 
help ensure uniformity. There is a current trend in 
other areas towards the giving of reasons - a 
procedural safeguard which promotes the the quality 
of decision making.5 Difficult decisions, like those 
outlined above, would be decided in particular cases. 
rather than in general. The general answers would 
emerge over time with the accumulation of judge-
ments. Previous ajudications would guide future ones 
without pre-empting them. The case 'law' would 
provide a guide to vendors as to how to practice 
reasonably. 
3. A Proposed Code of Practice 
As a basis for discussion, we propose below such a 
code of practice for AI vendors. Before we give 
this we must define our terms. In what follows 
below, the term: 
- AT product, means any piece of software 
or hardware or any service or any com-
bination of these which is based on AI 
techniques and which is offered for sale; 
- vendor, means a company selling an AI 
product, either to a customer direct or 
to a middleman, whether that company 
made the product or not; 
- customer, means a person or group who 
buys or attempts to buy an AI product 
from a vendor; 
- user, means the person who uses the AI 
product, in particular the person who in-
teracts with the product if it is inter-
active. 
The proposed code \$: 
The vendor of an AI product should 
describe to the customer, and where ap-
propriate the general public, the abilities 
and limitations of the product as accurately 
as possible, taking account of the likely 
expectations of the intended customer. In 
particular, the vendor should accurately 
describe, in so far as the state of the art 
and its own knowledge enables this to be 
done: 
1. what the product does, including an 
account of its scope, limitations and 
reliability; 
2. known bugs in the product; 
3. the consequences of failure of the 
product; 
Saa a.g. tha Criminal Justice act 19B2. 
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4. the amount and type of user inter-
action required and how and at 
what cost it is to be obtained; 
5. the skill and knowledge required of 
the user; 
6. the computational requirements of 
the product, e.g. hardware and 
software environment. space and 
time requirements in different en-
vironments; 
7. the amount and type of maintenance 
required and the cost of this; 
8. any social, economic or legal implica-
tions of the use of the product, 
where these can be assessed. 
It is the responsibility of the vendor to 
see that this code is observed by any 
agent acting on its behalf, e.g. a salesman. 
The vendor is also responsible for ensuring 
that any middlemen which sell its products 
are fully acquainted with the necessary in-
formation to enable them to comply with 
the code. 
An informed customer will, in any case, ask about 
1-7 above, and a reasonable vendor should supply 
the information unasked. Thus this part of the 
code merely makes good practice explicit, as it was 
intended to do. In conjunction with the case 'law', 
it should help protect the uninformed customer and 
define the standards to be met to become a 
reasonable vendor. 
Point 8 is rather different from the others. It 
was inserted to try to protect the wider interests 
of society as well as those of the customers. It 
might be criticised as being impractical to realise or 
as not appropriate in this context. However, we 
feel that something like it is required somewhere, 
and we would welcome suggestions as to how best 
to meet this requirement. Maybe it needs to be 
dealt with by separate machinery. 
It is not our intention that vendors be required 
to state political or ethical opinions, nor that the 
Association be asked to judge such opinions; it 
would be beyond their competence to do so. In 
point 8 we wanted only to encourage vendors to 
make statements which were within their technical, 
legal, etc. competence so as to enable others to 
form accurate political and ethical opinions about 
the impact of the product. For instance, all the 
photocopiers at Sussex University have a prominent 
notice above them detailing the law relating to 
copyright. Vendors of AI products should, similarly, 
draw the attention of users to illegal uses of their 
product. 
It is not intended that complainants actually in-
tend to be customers of the vendors they complain 
of, but they should have a legitimate interest in 
the product over and above commercial competition. 
For instance, suppose an expert in the field believes 
that a vendor is misleading customers about a 
product or that the vendor is producing a product 
that will be harmful to society; we would like that 
expert to be able to bring a case to the Associa-
tion. On the other hand the Association would have 
to be alive to attempts by vendors to undermine 
their rivals by bringing malicious complaints - and 
should fi lter out such complaints at an early stage. 
4. Related Codes and Laws 
The above proposal is complementary to the exist-
ing system of codes and laws applying to AI. 
For instance, in the UK, the British Computer 
Society and, in the USA, the Association for Com-
puting Machinery both provide codes of conduct for 
their members, [BCS 81, ACM 8?]. We imagine that 
most other national computing societies have similar 
codes. Neither of these codes apply to AI 
products or vendors, as such. There is a small area 
of overlap in that a salesman who is a member of 
the BCS or ACM is required to behave honestly and 
competently in promoting a product. However, any 
sanctions for breaking the BCS or ACM codes would 
fall on the individual rather than the company. Our 
code is intended to apply to vendors, which would 
usually be companies rather than individuals. 
In the UK, the Trade Descriptions Act uses 
criminal sanctions to protect customers from false 
claims, and the Sale g± Goods Acts and the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 permit civil remedies for 
defective goods. Other countries have similar laws. 
However, as illustrated above, there is a large grey 
area between illegal behaviour and the behaviour of 
a reasonable vendor. It is the purpose of the 
above proposal to deal with this grey area, where 
the vendor has clearly behaved unreasonably, but not 
in such a way as to constitute a criminal offence 
or grounds for a civil action. For this reason it 
would not be appropriate for the proposed Associa-
tion to impose the kind sanctions that would be 
imposed by a court of law. An unreasonable vendor 
should still be allowed to trade, but should not be 
allowed to use the cachet of membership of an 
association of reasonable vendors, with whatever as-
surance of high-quality that that was generally felt 
to imply. 
The British Standards Institute defines standards 
for many products. Vendors whose products meet 
these standards are able to advertise that fact 
with a 'kite mark'. In some cases the standards 
6 
set have been adopted by the law. There is 
currently an attempt to define a BSI standard for 
Prolog. Unfortunately, few AI products lend them-
selves to such definitions of standards. It is not 
worthwhile to try to define one unless very similar 
products are being produced by a number of ven-
dors and there is a wide agreement on a de facto 
standard. Major and stabilised programming lan-
guages seem possible candidates, but customised ex-
pert systems, and even expert systems shells, do 
not. 
E.g. motorcycle crash helmets must be worn and must comply 
with a minimum BSI standard. 
A. Bundy and R. Clutterbuck 1293 
5. A Discussion of Problems 
There is a danger of a few companies annexing 
the Association to themselves and excluding worthy 
competition. But this is not a major danger. 
Firstly, in the current state of the AI market, AI 
companies have a lot to gain by encouraging high-
quality in other AI companies. Every success in-
creases the market for everyone, whereas failure 
decreases it. Until the size of the market has 
been established and the capacity of the companies 
has risen to meet it, AI companies have more to 
gain than to lose by mutual support. Secondly, 
excluded companies can always set up a rival as-
sociation. There is room for more than one as-
sociation, and they could compete by trying to set 
the highest standard for membership. However, too 
many associations would be confusing to consumers 
and would diminish their influence and effectiveness. 
There is also a danger of the Association develop-
ing into a trade protection society, i.e. of main-
taining low standards by protecting its members 
from disgruntled customer by offering weak excuses 
for faulty products and by not employing effective 
sanctions. If this happened then customers would 
lose confidence in the Association and membership 
would cease to carry any assurance of high-quality. 
Membership would still be attractive to vendors who 
wanted to use the Association's excuses to fob off 
disgruntled customers. However, provided the As-
sociation did not have a monopoly, there would be 
nothing to stop a more principled group of vendors 
forming a rival association as above. 
The Association would always be at risk of legal 
action against it from disgruntled vendors who 
might sue for libel. It would need to take care 
that its pronouncements were fair comment' and to 
take legal advice on them. It should also try to 
create the conditions under which vendors would 
have more to lose from the bad publicity accruing 
from the court case than they would gam from any 
damages awarded. But to guard against such actions, 
the Association would have to maintain a legal 
defence fund contributed by the members. 
6. Passive vs Active Role 
We have proposed that the Association take a 
passive role, reacting to complaints, rather than an 
active role, pre-vetting products and/or instigating 
investigations of products with its own team of 
investigators. Our reasons are practical rather than 
principled. An active role would require money and 
people. Most AI companies are small and newly 
set-up; they might be loath to provide the large 
sums of money required to set up the investigative 
machinery, but might be prepared to fund a, much 
cheaper, passive association. AI experts are cur-
rently rare and expensive. Most such experts want 
either to conduct their own research or set-up 
their own companies. It would be hard to recruit 
good full-time investigators. One might find 
academics prepared to work part-time, but most 
candidates would have some existing consultancy ar-
rangements that might disqualify them. We have 
also argued that, while the field is still immature, 
it is more difficult to set standards that a pre-
vetted product must meet than to evaluate the 
complaints of a customer against the code of prac-
tice and previous cases. 
For the same reasons we have not proposed the 
direct registration of AI products. To issue a 
certificate of good quality to an individual product 
would require a prior investigation of that product; 
it would no longer be possible to employ the 
default assumption that the product of a member 
of the Association was assumed good unless proved 
otherwise. That is, direct registration of products 
would require an active Association with all the 
associated expense, employment of rare expertise 
and setting of prior standards. The passive 
mechanism proposed above indirectly ensures good 
quality products by encouraging the vendors to 
produce products that will not attract complaints. 
The burden of criticising the product and proving 
that criticism falls on the complainant. The panel 
need only investigate differences in the evidence 
presented to them by the complainant and vendor 
about the product complained of; this investigation 
would be relatively cheap compared with that re-
quired to register every product. 
Unfortunately, this means that the burden of 
proof falls on the customer. But this is not as 
bad as it seems; currently, most AI customers are 
themselves AI practioners, to some degree. For 
instance, the customers for expert systems shells 
and knowledge representation systems are often 
researchers from the AI laboratories of other com-
panies. Hence, they are in a position to investigate 
the product, and bring a complaint. They only lack a 
body to bring it to. 
All this might change: AI companies might get 
richer and more able to fund an active association. 
AI experts might get thicker on the ground, stan-
dards might get better defined as the field ma-
tures, the average AI expertise of customers might 
decline as the customer base expands. In this case, 
there is nothing to stop the Association moving to 
a more active role. 
7. Relationship to the Law 
We have proposed a extra-legal regulatory 
mechanism, i.e. one without legally enforceable 
sanctions. One reason is that we are aiming to 
regulate in the grey area of legal but unreasonable 
practice. Another reason is that we would like to 
see an international association covering countries 
with different legal systems, so no one legal 
framework can be assumed. A third reason is that 
we want to make it as easy as possible for the 
Association to get started; an extra-legal mechanism 
involves the minimum of bureaucratic hassle. 
This proposal, however, creates problems. The 
boundary between legal and illegal practice is fuzzy; 
infringement of some aspects of the code of prac-
tice (e.g. points 1-3) may sometimes give rise to 
legal remedies. Even when legal remedies were pos-
sible there may still be situations in which both 
complainant and vendor would prefer to refer the 
matter to the Association because it provided a 
cheaper and quicker mechanism for settling the dis-
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pute. However, if cases were referred for legal 
remedv then the workings of the Association might 
be undermined; such cases would become sub-judice 
and the Association would no longer be able to 
comment on them until they were decided (which 
might take a long time). 
However, as it develops the Association might seek 
statutory authority in the countries in which it 
operated. This authority might include, for in-
stance: 
- the right to grant licences enabling com-
panies to become vendors of AI products; 
- protection from libel action in its judge-
ments; 
- that infringement of the code of prac-
tice would raise a presumption of fault 
against an infringing vendor in any legal 
action. 
Note that such legal powers increase the dangers of 
the Association becoming a trade protection society. 
In particular, the right to grant licences gives a 
monopoly that might be used to exclude competi-
tion. Therefore, it would need to be offset with 
rights to the customer and the vendor to prevent 
abuse, e.g the vendor might have the right of legal 
action if unfairly excluded from membership, the 
Association might be required to pre-vet and then 
underwrite the products of its members, so that 
dissatisfied customers could sue the Association. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed a mechanism for 
peer-policing of standards in AI products. The 
mechanism consists of an association of vendors of 
AI products who would use a code of practice to 
sanction vendors who are guilty of unreasonable 
practice. It is similar to associations used by other 
groups of companies and professionals offering ser-
vices or selling products. It is necessary if AI is 
not to harm itself and society by the products it 
produces. Some such mechanism is vital to the 
existing, responsible AI companies if they are to 
protect their investment in AI; they must try to 
prevent a few irresponsible companies from exploit-
ing their customers with overrated or useless 
products and putting those customers of f of AI 
products in general. 
but there are not yet many major AI companies, 
and it seems more likely that they would be 
prepared to get together than that IBM, ICL, 
Honeywell, etc. would be. However, since many AI 
products will also contain non-AI techniques, it may 
eventually be necessary to widen the remit of any 
AI association. 
The above mechanism is only able to regulate 
commercial companies. We have argued above that 
academics already have a self-regulatory mechanism 
of peer review. However, there is major gap in that 
neither mechanism covers government organisations, 
e.g. the military. That is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but not beyond our desires. 
This paper is intended as a vehicle for discussion 
of the problems of maintaining high standards in AI 
products. It does this by presenting a proposal, 
but this proposal is not intended as definitive. We 
would welcome feedback - especially on the code of 
practice itself. We hope that this paper will 
inspire those companies that care about high stan-
dards to get together, and we hope that they will 
see that it is in their direct interest to do so. 
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